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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this note is to clarify how the idea of "causal depth" can play a role in 
finding the more "approximately true" explanation through causal comparisons. It is 
not an exhaustive treatment but rather focuses on a few aspects that may be the most 
critical in evaluating the explanatory strengths of a theory in the social sciences. It 
presents a general argument which is anti-Humean  on the critical side and scientific 
realist on the positive side. It also elucidates how explanations in political economy 
and other social sciences can be judged by the scientific realist criterion of causal 
depth by an extensive example from research in the political economy of 
development. In this case, an "intentional" and methodologically individualist 
neoclassical explanation is contrasted with a "structural" dual-dual approach as rival 
theories purporting to explain the same set of phenomena.  
 
Keywords: Social Explanation,Causal Depth, Scientific Realism, Political Economy, 
Neoclassical Economics, Structuralism, Social Science Theories, Economic Models 
 
 3 
1. Introduction: Causal Depth contra Humean Empiricism 
 
One of David Hume's great insights was to recognize that while events were 
observable, their putative underlying "causes" were not observable. What were 
observable such as spatial contiguity, temporal succession etc. turned out in his 
analysis not to be causes at all but the prejudices of our thinking. The incisiveness of 
Hume's empiricist analysis which found that there was no causality beyond the 
empirical regularities observed led Kant to declare that it was Hume who awakened 
him from his "dogmatic slumber". 
 
 Kant's awakening produced the classic " Critique of Pure Reason" where Kant 
attempted to rescue causality by arguing that by his transcendental deductions 
causality along with universality, necessity etc. needed to be conceptualized as 
"categories of our mind". In the twentieth century, the logical positivists rejected the 
Kantian solution and embraced the Humean position albeit with typical flourishes of 
symbolic logic that was developing at an accelerated pace in the 1920s. Thus logical 
positivists such as Hempel or Carnap eschew causal language wherever possible. If 
cause is mentioned at all, it is to be understood as part of an empirical law or law-like 
statement. Hempel's deductive nomological model is the most rigorous and elegant 
example of this practice. 
 
In contrast to the empiricist tradition, the scientific realists have always--- although 
not always equally clearly or forcefully--- emphasized causal explanations. In the 19th 
century, Darwin himself was an exponent of this view as a close study of his 1836-
1844 notebooks reveal. Huxley was, as usual, much more forthright and pugnacious 
than Darwin. For example in Huxley(1894:Vol.1;158-9), one reads: 
 
any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit, that its progress has, in all 
ages meant, and now, more than ever, means, the extension of the province of what we call 
matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of thought of 
what we call spirit and spontaneity. 
 
Likewise, George Romanes, another 19th century realist and a friend of both Darwin 
and Huxley, writes of  Darwinism that it 
 
seeks to bring the phenomena of organic nature into line with those of inorganic; and therefore to 
show that whatever view we may severally take as to the kind of causation which is energizing in 
the latter we must now extend to the former. . . .the theory of evolution by natural selection . . 
.endeavours to comprise all the facts of adaptation in organic nature under the same category of 
explanation as those which occur in inorganic nature – that is to say, under the category of physical, 
or ascertainable, causation. (Romanes, 1893:402) 
 
What is significant in all these is that Darwin, as Dennet (1995) has most clearly 
pointed out, more than any other scientist before him articulates and exemplifies a 
causal approach to scientific explanation by appealing to both non-observable and 
deep underlying causal processes. It is probably more helpful to study Darwin's 
notebooks than even the most articulate realist philosopher of science to see how a 
search for deep, non-mystical explanation can proceed in a complex, almost uncharted 
territory.1 In this, there is a lot for social scientists to learn. 
                                               
1See Barrett et. als eds.(1987), Darwin(1859,1871,1883), Dewey(1910) Hodgson(2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, Knudsen (2004), Mayr (1964,1988,1992) 
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However, even if we grant that the notion of cause is not problematic---it actually is 
still controversial among the philosophers (See Sosa and Tooley (1993) and Salmon 
(1998)) although specification of causal mechanisms in terms of non-observable 
entities whose causal effects are in principle observable will be accepted by most 
scientists as a practical way to proceed2--- the question of how to choose from among 
a list of alternative causes still remains.  
 
The purpose of this note is to clarify how the idea of "causal depth" can play a role in 
this endeavor. I will not try to be exhaustive but will rather focus on a few aspects that 
may be the most critical in evaluating the explanatory strengths of a theory. I will 
present an example from research in development economics where an "intentional" 
neoclassical explanation is contrasted with a "structural" dual-dual approach to the 
same set of phenomena.  
 
Although the present approach is, at least in part, intended to draw attention to the 
revolutionary contributions of Darwin both to science and the philosophy of science, 
it is compatible with the contemporary developments including Boyd's ( and 
Harman's) abductive defence of scientific realism  as inference to the best explanation 
and Bhaskar's critical realism.3 However, in contrast with both and consonant with 
Miller (1987), I focus attention on the need for drawing out the principles of the 
relevant realist philosophy of science from within the "topic-specific" practices of 
particular sciences. The purpose of this essay is not to establish this proposition 
deductively but rather to illustrate its plausibility by pinpointing the philosophical 
principles embodied in actual pieces of scientific work in a specific problem area. 
 
 
2. A (Partial) Characterization of Causal Depth and Some Exemplars 
 
The essential idea of causal depth4 as a selection criterion for explanations is that 
among the rival theoretical explanations for a given phenomenon, the deepest 
explanation---deepest compared to its rivals at the time--- is to be chosen 
provisionally as the "best"(" approximately true") explanation. As Miller (1987:88) 
puts it: 
 
Suppose a list of causes fits an appropriate standard causal pattern and accurately describes factors 
sufficient under the circumstances to bring about the effect in question. It may still fail to explain 
because those causes lack sufficient depth. Roughly speaking, a cause is too shallow to explain why 
something occurred if it is just one of the ways in which another cause, as intimately connected with 
the effect, produced the latter. In the slogan version of the causal theory of explanation, such causes 
are excluded by the requirement that "underlying" causes be described. Actually, "not underlain" 
                                               
2
 There are some worries in physics about quantum causality and particularly non-locality after Bell's 
inequality was used by Aspect to show that non-locality did exist at the sub-atomic level. However, 
given the existence of "decoherence" at a larger scale level of our world, this may not be such a 
problem. For the social world there still remains the problem of mind-body identity vs. panpsychism 
and the role of consciousness and meaning that phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches 
emphasize. However, I believe that at the present state of our knowledge such issues are not resolvable, 
and we should be open-minded about alternative modes of explanations in the social sciences. Here, 
clearly the attention is restricted to the set of causal explanations that can be compared meaningfully. 
3
 See Boyd(1973,1992),Harman(1965),Bhaskar(1975), Lawson(1997) 
4
 See also Wilson(1994) and Wendt(1998,1999,2000,2001) 
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would be the more accurate, but absolutely ugly term, since the question is whether one cause is 
undermined by another. 
More specifically, a cause, X, helping to bring about Y, is too shallow to explain why Y occurred if 
a cause, Z, of Y undermines X in one of two ways: (a) If X had not occurred, Y would have 
happened anyway; Z would have produced some causal substitute for X, bringing Y about in some 
other way. I will label the depth that X lacks, and Z may have here, "depth as necessity." (b) Z is a 
condition in which Y arose that caused Y, and caused it, in part, by causing X; Z is causally prior to 
X yet, also, too intimately related to Y to be bracketed as a remote cause. I will refer to this aspect or 
depth using the label "depth as priority." 
 
In both depth as necessity and depth as priority the Darwinian example insists on a 
trans-empirical and scientific realist theoretical approach. Such an approach pays 
close attention to both contemporaneous and historical data but at the same time 
attempts to imagine in a creative manner various causal connections based on non-
observable theoretical entities. 
 
 In the Humean or logical positivist way of explaining, the dogma is to stick with the 
"facts” or ---to use a somewhat refined philosophical language--- sense-data. 
However, as Quine, Putnam and many others have pointed out the Humean rejection 
of "metaphysics" is itself dogmatic and close-minded since it fails to acknowledge its 
own ontological commitments. 
 
 In some formulations, the Humean "refusal" of ontology can indeed become self-
refuting in the same way that relativism is self-refuting. A causal approach as Darwin 
in particular uses it will sift through a number of rivals to settle upon the most 
plausible---one could loosely use the language of verifications here as well--- 
alternative in light of the data. Darwin's own example involving bats is particularly 
elegant. 
 
I have carefully searched the oldest voyages, but have not finished my search; as yet, I have not 
found a single instance, free from doubt, of a terrestrial mammal (excluding domesticated animals 
kept by the natives) inhabiting an island situated above 300 miles from a continent or great 
continental island; and many islands situated at a much less distance are equally barren. . . . 
Though terrestrial mammals do not occur on oceanic islands, aerial mammals do occur on almost 
every island. New Zealand possesses two bats found nowhere else in the world: Norfolk Island, the 
Viti Archipelago, the Bonin Islands, the Caroline and Marianne Archipelagoes, and Mauritius, all 
possess their peculiar bats. Why, it may be asked, has the supposed creative force produced bats 
but no other mammals on remote islands? On my view this question can be easily answered: for no 
terrestrial mammal can be transported across a wide space of sea, but bats can fly across. [More 
specifically, bat transport occurs to provide a basis for speciation through natural selection, but 
occurs so infrequently that variants on remote islands are not overwhelmed by migrants from the 
more competitive mainland.]5 
 
It is important to emphasize here that Darwin is engaging in a particularly significant 
type of causal comparison in this example. As Miller points out: 
 
Here as throughout the book, Darwin is comparing his favored hypothesis of speciation 
through natural selection not with the mere supposition of its falsehood but with rival 
hypotheses about the factors at work in the phenomena. The existence of islands with terrain 
hospitable to terrestrial mammals lacking such endemic species is important because the 
main rival is the hypothesis, dominant among the best-informed secular-minded scientists of 
the time, that species are created, without ancestors, by a force that makes them well-
adapted to their environments. Also, Darwin makes his argument on the basis of principles 
he shares with the other side, for example, the shared principle that offspring are like their 
                                               
5
 Quoted from The Origin of Species in Miller(1987) p. 164; See also Darwin(1871,1883) 
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parents but subject to small variations, not the tendentiously anti-creationist, though 
plausible principle that a complex organism must be the offspring of another. Finally, Darwin is 
not claiming to have a complete explanation of the phenomena in question, although he certainly 
thinks that the complete answer would entail the approximate truth of his natural-selection 
hypothesis. Elsewhere, he makes it clear both that the mechanisms of heredity and variation are 
mysterious to him and that there is no 
way of predicting how an observed advantage will affect the actual course of speciation. The 
issue for him is whether the best available account of the data, however vague or incomplete, 
entails the superiority of the natural selection hypothesis over its current rivals.6 
 
This type of argumentation is also common in physics when the contest among rival 
theories demands causally explicit comparisons. An example is Newton's contrast of 
the causal mechanisms in his celestial mechanics with rival accounts such as 
Cartesian vortex theories and Tycho Brahe's system. 
 
 His discussion of comets in his summary pamphlet, " The System of the World", 
makes this clear. Indeed, comets are most appropriate for the purpose of causal 
comparison in this context. All the rival theories in this example share the principles 
of geometric optics. By using these non-controversial shared principles Newton could 
derive important features of the orbits of comets.  
 
Once these orbits are derived mathematically, it then can be argued that the Ptolemaic 
celestial spheres found in Brahe's descriptive geocentric theory can not really exist. 
For if they did, then surely comets would collide against them. Likewise, the 
Cartesian vortices can not be the agents that move the planets and other celestial 
bodies. Newton observes that comets follow a dynamic trajectory through all parts of 
the sky which is inconsistent with the dynamics resulting from a vortex. 
 
One could easily multiply such examples from the mature sciences. I hope the above 
examples demonstrate the need for taking rival theories seriously and for establishing 
alternative causal mechanisms which can be examined by using techniques of 
observation and logical procedures which are accepted as fair by all sides. It should 
also be noted that this is not simply a plea for mainstream theorists to take seriously 
the causal mechanisms postulated by the non-mainstream theories. The argument is 
symmetric. In fact, there are grounds for stressing that the challengers to the 
mainstream theories need to spell out the causal mechanisms of both their own 
alternative theories and the rival mainstream theories as well as the shared principles 
among these alternatives.  Much dogmatism in social sciences can be avoided if rival 
theorists were to make explicit the causal mechanisms and the grounds for what 
would comprise a fair causal comparison among rival theories.  
 
It needs to be emphasized that even after clarifying shared principles, there will 
generally be substantive areas of disagreement among contending theories. However, 
in this instance at least, the discussion of substantive disagreements and their possible 
resolution can proceed without talking at cross-purposes. There are more difficult 
cases where the framework principles themselves are in dispute. For such cases, it is 
necessary to develop a detailed theory of confirmation that would rely on topic-
specific rules within a field or sub-field of inquiry rather than some global a priori or 
deductivist general rule ( for example, the failed logical positivist attempt to offer 
such global rules of confirmation for all sciences).  
                                               
6
 Miller (1987) pp.164-65. 
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While such a theory of confirmation for economics, political economy or the social 
sciences in general is yet to be fully developed, the approach defended here would 
call for a consideration of specific debates in substantive areas in order to develop 
such specific principles of confirmation. In particular, the demands for causal depth in 
specific theories would have to play a critical role in developing these topic-specific 
principles. 
 
I now turn from the biological and physical sciences to a topic-specific example in 
political economy of development. In recent years the neoclassical optimizing agent 
approach to institutions has gained prominence. The claim by its proponents (see Ray 
1997, for a particularly lucid and rigorous presentation of the strongest version of the 
neoclassical approach) is that these intentional explanations involving the decision 
making problem of the representative agent are to be preferred to more structural 
models which do not seem to have "microfoundations". The mathematics of 
optimization gives it additional credibility. Yet, what are the claims of the more 
structural "dualistic" models of development inspired by classical political economy? 
 
The most advanced and therefore the most appropriate candidate for causal 
comparison with the neoclassical model is what can be called a “dual-dual” model 
(Svejnar and Thorbecke 1980, 1982, Khan 1982a, b, 1985, 1994, 1997, 2004a, b, 
2006; Khan and Thorbecke 1988, 1989; Thorbecke, 1992, 1994; Thorbecke and 
Santiago, 1984; Thorbecke and Morrisson. 1989). This corresponds to the 
characteristics of a developing economy with not only the traditional and modern 
sectors but also a kind of dualism within each of these sectors in terms of 
formal/informal dichotomy. More specifically, the process of development for 
economies moving from the least developed status to a higher level of development 
may modify the traditional sector further in the direction of a more market-based 
modern sector while the formal/informal dichotomy is accentuated within both the 
sectors.  This is one of the most important moves theoretically which is consistent 
with the stylized facts to be explained in the course of economic development without 
introducing ad hoc assumptions. In fact, the dual-dual theory reveals that even within 
the category of the least developed economies the theoretical possibility of the uneven 
development of the formal and informal sectors both in the urban and the rural areas 
can exist. In recent years, it has indeed been empirically confirmed as well. 
 
Thus, in this theoretical framework, the coexistence and distribution of modern and 
informal type of activities in both rural and urban areas are taken as basic structural 
features of the economy in question. The structural dual-dual approach integrates 
poverty analysis with rural-urban movements in an economy wide setting by 
endogenizing both migration7 and intra-group income distributions and the nominal 
poverty line. Following this line of work leads to the social scientists' being able to 
assess policy repercussions on both poverty specific to particular socioeconomic 
groups and on overall national poverty. 
 
To elaborate a bit further, the starting point is the dual economy models of Lewis 
(1954) and Fei and Ranis (1964)8.The roots of Lewis' seminal work are in the 
                                               
7
 Within an overall trend towards rapid urbanization there can be migration in both directions. This can 
have important implications for poverty reduction policies, as Khan (2006) shows for South Asia. 
8
 See Khan (1997) chs. 2 and 3 for a historical survey and a specific intertemporal dualistic model 
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classical political economy. These pioneering efforts, however, could not or did not 
take into account the co-presence of dualism within each sector of the two sector 
models of the dual economy. Erik Thorbecke first raised this issue in 1979 during the 
course of a National Science Foundation interdisciplinary project on technology and 
development and Svejnar and Thorbecke (1980, 1982) was the first published work 
on a prototype of dual-dual technology classification scheme. Khan (1982a, b) and 
Khan (1985) were applications of this scheme to the energy and textiles sectors in 
South Korea. Khan (1983) raised the issue of linking technological dualism to poverty 
theoretically, following an early observation of Pyatt and Thorbecke (1976). Khan and 
Thorbecke (1988, 1989) were further applications of technological dualism to 
Indonesia. Khan (1999) explores the connections between rural-urban dualism and 
migration and poverty in South Africa. Khan (2006) explores both rural-urban and 
reverse migration in a dual-dual model for South Asia.  
 
In the current formulation, a rural/urban dichotomy is combined with 
traditional/modern technological dualism, leading to a fourfold classificatory scheme.9 
The four broadly defined sectors in this scheme are: 
 
1. Subsistence agriculture with traditional labor-intensive technologies, 
family farms and food crops for domestic consumption; 
2. Large-scale agriculture producing mostly export crops using capital-
intensive technology. 
3. Urban informal sector defined in an operational manner; 
4. Modern sector with industry and services in the urban areas. 
 
Poverty analysis in this dual-dual approach can be integrated with migration and 
various shocks that are important features of the urbanization process in developing 
countries. Thus, in addition to explaining the standard "development scenario", the 
dual-dual model explains additional features of development--- particularly the 
uneven nature of this process in a number of dimensions--- which the neoclassical 
approach can not. The fact is that while individual agents may or may not optimize, 
the causally deeper political economy approach can explain a number of observable 
phenomena that the neoclassical theory can not explain and this is in addition to 
explaining the same range of phenomena. Furthermore, in the neoclassical version, 
the observable market segmentation, surplus labor etching developing economies are 
derived from the optimizing agent setting only by introducing ad hoc assumptions 
about information, implicit prices, discount rates etc The equations of the model 
below show that the so-called micro-foundations at the household and firm levels can 
also be incorporated in the formalization of this theory. In addition, the 
formal/informal and rural/urban structural features are also modeled appropriately. 
 
An important general lesson about causal depth can also be drawn from this example. 
If scientific realism is even approximately true then pinpointing the ontologically real 
features in an approximate fashion will likely lead to further discoveries. The history 
of the mature sciences corroborates this view. It turns out that in social sciences, too, 
causally deeper theories can lead to deeper insights as well as further discoveries. This 
is another reason to reject the Humean straitjacket. But more importantly, it is also a 
                                                                                                                                       
which is used to analyze the conflict between employment and output. 
9
 See Svejnar-Thorbecke (1980, 1982) and Khan (1983) for early developments. See also Khan (1997, 
2006) and Stifel-Thorbecke (2003). 
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good reason to reject dogmatic, a prioristic formulas for doing science even when 
they carry the attractive label of scientific realism, as they sometimes do. The moral is 
to follow what creative scientists do in any field but to do it with an awareness of the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions of rival theories. 
 
For the interested reader, the formal representation of the dual-dual model is given 
below. 
 
A Formal Representation of Dual-Dual Model with CES Production Functions 
(complete description of the notation is given in appendix) 
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The production sectors are specified as CES with the choice of nonunitary 10 
                                               
10
 Stifel-Thorbecke paper uses Cobb-Douglas production functions with elasticities of substitution 
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elasticities of substitution for the two formal sector commodities in equations 1 and 2. 
The informal sector commodities also have CES specifications. All commodities are 
produced under capital constraints. Thus, capital, K, in each sector has an upper 
bound denoted by a bar above K. The assumption that capital stock is fixed in each 
sector may be relaxed, but it is in fact, a fairly standard assumption for developing 
economies. 
 
In the informal sectors each worker receives her average revenue product. Rural small 
holders may work on common land and these rural farming households may share the 
total income equally among all the family members. Urban informal workers supply 
all their labor at the prevailing wage rate. Thus leisure is not an argument in their 
objective function. This may be defended as an extreme assumption when people are 
at the margins of subsistence. Equations 5 and 6 show the informal sectors’ income 
determination. 
 
The total income per unit includes logically the returns also to nonlabor assets for 
those who own land or capital. Hence, the relevant measure of income is total income 
per unit from all sources. 
 
The profit maximizing rural large landholders ensure that under competitive 
conditions wages for unskilled workers in the export sector are equal to the marginal 
revenue product of the unskilled labor they have to hire. Equation 7 reflects this 
condition. 
 
Equation 8 shows the equilibrium allocation of unskilled labor in the rural informal 
sector. In equilibrium, the rural sector wage rate is below the wage rate in the formal 
sector by a fixed factor. This reflects the assumption that there are transactions costs 
in working in the rural formal sector that is captured by this mark up.11 
 
Turning now to the import sector, for unskilled workers in the urban area the 
assumption here is that they get the income per unit of labor in the urban services 
sector (shown in equation 9) plus a share of the profits as given in equation 10. The 
profit determination itself is shown in equation 11.  
 
The Harris-Todaro model features regarding rural-urban migration are captured in 
equation 12. Here, in equilibrium, rural wage must equal the expected wage in the 
urban sector. In equation 12, the probability of getting a job in the import sector is 
given by the share of the urban uneducated labor force in that  particular sector 
multiplied by a scale parameter, h. 
 
Skilled workers are employed only in the formal sectors. Their wages are determined 
in equations 13 and 14 by their marginal revenue products. We now turn to the 
determination of incomes for the households. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
restricted to a value of 1. 
11
 Alternatively, one could also postulate that there is an ‘insider’ market wage equilibrium in the 
formal sector, and those unskilled workers lucky enough ( or more likely, because they know someone 
already working in the formal sector) to get a job in the formal sector  
can enjoy this wage premium. This is not a hypothesis the authors consider, but the data will be 
consistent with this hypothesis as well. 
 12 
 
Household Income Determination: 
 
There are nine types of households. Two in the rural area are landowning households-
-- large and small. There are also urban capitalists and bureaucrats. The other five are 
households where the main source of income is from labor. 
 
The rural informal households which are really rural small holders receive their total 
revenue from production as shown in equation 16. Rural unskilled and skilled 
households receive their wage incomes as shown in equations 17 and 18 respectively. 
Equation 19 gives the incomes of the rural large land holders. 
 
Equations 20- 24 show the incomes of the urban households. The working class 
households receive wage income and the capitalists the profit incomes, in general. 
The bureaucratic households capture part of the rents from imports by colluding with 
the rent seekers.12 
The formal sector employers (rural large land owners and urban capitalists) are the 
only savers in the model. They each save a constant fraction of their nominal incomes. 
 
Household demand functions are captured by maximization of Cobb-Douglas utility 
functions subject to their income constraints. There are 23 such equations (equations 
27-49) because the four rural household groups have access to only food and 
importables. This gives us eight equations. Each of the urban groups has access to 
three commodities--- food, importables and urban services. This gives another 15 
equations. The prices for the three commodities can be used to define an overall 
deflator. 
 
Foreign Trade: 
 
Imports in this model are the difference between domestic demand and production of 
import competing sector. Exports can be supplied at the prevailing price up to any 
quantity under the small country assumption. Thus exports are equal to total output 
less the savings in the form of exportables of the rural large landholders. Equations 50 
and 51 show the import and export demand functions respectively. 
 
 
Equilibrium conditions for the model as a whole and 
Causal Depth: 
 
 
There are two sets of equilibrium conditions in the model. First, the labor market 
equilibrium conditions are given by equations 52 and 53. There is disguised 
unemployment, as discussed before, but no formal involuntary unemployment. The 
second set of equilibrium conditions given by equations 50 and 51 is that the domestic 
demand for the informal sector goods and services is matched by domestic supply. 
Prices in the formal sectors are set by the world market prices. The export price is 
normalized to one. The import price is equal to 1+t, where t is the tariff rate. 
Exchange rate is held fixed during the particular modelling period. It is clear that the 
                                               
12 Salaries are excluded in equation 24. The reasoning is that these are invariant to exogenous shocks. 
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current account balance must be exogenous. This balance is equal to foreign savings 
which are assumed to be zero here. Hence current account balance is assumed to be 
zero.13 This completes the description of the formal model. It is clear that this model 
has greater causal depth than the standard neoclassical optimizing model since the 
households and firms can optimize here but within a deeper socio-economic structure. 
In addition to the standard explananda common to the concerns of the two rival 
models, these structural features allow the social scientist to explain other phenomena 
such as poverty, migration and their interactions among other things.  
 
 
3. Conclusions: 
   
 
In this short note I have tried to defend a partial but useful characterization of causal 
depth. I have shown that this view is close to the view implicit in the practice of great 
scientists such as Darwin and Newton. In contrast to Hume and Humeans, scientific 
realism can advocate such a practice through careful comparisons of relevant theories 
in a specific area of research. Such causal comparisons are necessary for judging if 
the theory in question really does explain the phenomena it purports to explain more 
deeply than the other contenders. In addition, a "causally deep" theory will generally 
lead to further insights that are genuinely novel. The formal presentation of the 
structural dual-dual model makes this particularly clear vis-à-vis its neoclassical rival. 
 
However, it is necessary to sound a note of caution here. Indeed, if one is not careful, 
there is a danger of making scientific realism as a philosophy of science---even when 
it claims to be critical-- as a prioristic and dogmatic as logical empiricism. The 
antidote to such danger is to cultivate a conscious habit of comparing alternative 
theories according to specific criteria for causal depth among other things. Such 
comparisons are never complete or final which is really another way of looking at 
science as an open-ended social process. 
 
Appendix  
Notation and symbol explanation: 
Production and Labor Market 
)2()1.....(....................
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⎡
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−
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Eqn 1-2: output of formal sector [superscript/subscript; fc=formal sector 
commodities] 
X=output in formal sector; A=Technology coefficient; K=Fixed capital; β=share of 
input in output; LS= skilled labor; LU=unskilled labor; µ=elasticity of substitution; 
                                               
13  Implicitly, this amounts to claiming for a reforming economy(see section 5 above) that the 
stabilization policies indeed succeed in restoring the external balance. 
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Eqn 3-4: output in informal sector [superscript/subscript; ic=informal sector 
commodities] 
X=output in formal sector; A=Technology coefficient; K=Fixed capital; β=share of 
input in output; LS= skilled labor; LU=unskilled labor; µ=elasticity of substitution; 
)6()5......(.......... −=
ic
icic
ic LU
XPi  
iic=income in informal sector (wage in informal sector is determined) 
)7......(..........
ex
ex
ex
LUex
ex LU
XP
wu
β
=  
wuex= unskilled labor wage in export sector [subscript ex is used for export sector 
representation]; β=share of input in output 
)8..().........1( δ+= foodex iwu  
δ= Transaction costs of work in rural formal sector (export) instead of working in 
food sector (for unskilled labor) ; ifood=income in food sector 
)9......(..........
im
im
im
LUim
srvc LU
XPi β=  
isrvc=income in service sector of unskilled workers 
)10......(..........
im
srvcim LU
iw Π+= γ  
wim= wages in import competing industry; γ=profit share ratio for unskilled labor in 
import competing sector; Π=profits; 
)11.....(..........imimimsrvcimim LSwsLUiXP −−=Π  
Π=profits of capitalists; wsim=skilled labor wage; 
)12......(..........)()1( im
imsrvc
im
srvc
imsrvc
im
ex wuLULU
hLU
wu
LULU
hLU
wu
+
+
+
−=  
h= scale parameter 
)14()13......(.......... −=
fc
fc
fc
LSfc
fc LS
XP
ws
β
 
wsfc= skilled wage in formal sector 
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im
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im
LU
im wsws
θ
βθβθ
β −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−
−
=  
wsim= skilled wage in import competing sector; θ= relative risk aversion of skilled 
workers 
Disposable income and savings 
)16......(..........foodfoodrih LUiI =  
Irih= disposable income of rural informal household 
)17......(..........exexruh LUwuI =  
Iruh= disposable income of rural unskilled household 
)18......(..........exexrsh LSwsI =  
Irsh= disposable income of rural skilled household 
)19......(..........exexexexexexexrlh SLUwuLSwsXPI −−−=  
Irlh= disposable income of rural large landholders household 
)20......(..........srvcsrvcuih LUiI =  
Iuih= disposable income of urban informal household 
)21......(..........imimuuh LUwsI =  
Iuuh= disposable income of rural unskilled household 
)22......(..........imimush LSwsI =  
Iush= disposable income of urban unskilled household 
)23......(..........imimimimimimimukh SLUwuLSwsXPI −−−=  
Iukh= disposable income of urban capitalist household 
)24......(..........tMIbch =  
Ibch= disposable income of bureaucrat household 
)26()25.......(].........[ −−−= fcfcfcfcfcfcfcfc LUwuLSwsXPS λ  
S=savings of formal sector employers (urban capitalists and rural large landholders) 
Demand 
)49()27......(.......... −=
c
h
h
ch
c P
IC α  
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α=budget share of commodities; I=household income; C=consumption of 
commodities by households; P=price of commidites; 
 
Foreign Trade 
)50......(..........im
im
im
h
h
im XP
SCM −+=∑  
M=import; C= demand for imported commodities; S=savings of capitalists; P=price 
of imported commodities; X=output in import competing sector; 
)51.....(..........
ex
ex
ex P
SXEX −=  
EX=export; X=output in export sector; S=savings of rural capitalists (large 
landholders); P=price of export commodities; 
Equilibrium Conditions 
)52......(..........∑ =c c LULU  
)53......(..........∑ =fc fc LSLS  
)55()54......(.......... −=∑h hicic CX  
)56......(..........1 tPim +≡  
P=price of imports; t= tariff rate 
)57......(..........1≡exP  
P=price of exports 
 
 
 
 
References: 
 
Barrett, Paul H., Gautrey, Peter J., Herbert, Sandra, Kohn, David and Smith, Sydney 
(eds) (1987) Charles Darwin’s Notebooks, 1836–1844: Geology, Transmutation of 
Species, Metaphysical Enquiries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bhaskar, Roy (1975) A Realist Theory of Science, 1st edn, Leeds: Leeds Books. 
Boyd, Richard N. (1973) "Realism, Underdetermination, and a Causal Theory of 
Evidence," Nous, pp. 1-12. 
 17 
------------------- (1992) "Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method," in 
J. Earman, ed. Inference, Explanation, and Other Philosophical Frustrations. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Darwin, Charles R. (1859) On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or 
the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, 1st edn, London: Murray. 
 
Darwin, Charles R. (1871) The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, 1st 
edn, 2 vols, London: Murray and New York: Hill. 
 
Darwin, Charles R. (1883) The Variation of Animals and Plants Under 
Domestication, 2 vols., 2nd edn, London and New York: Murray and Appleton. 
 
Dennett, Daniel C. (1995) Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of 
Life, London: Allen Lane. 
 
Dewey, John (1910) The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in 
Contemporary Philosophy, New York: Holt. 
Harman, Gilbert (1965). "The Inference to the Best Explanation," Philosophical 
Review pp. 88-95 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2001) ‘Darwin, Veblen and the problem of causality in 
economics’, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 23: 383–422. 
-------------------------- (2002) ‘Darwinism in Economics: from analogy to ontology’, 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 12(2): 259–81. 
 
-------------------------- (2003) ‘The mystery of the routine: the Darwinian destiny of 
An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change’, Revue Économique 54(2): 355–84. 
 
-------------------------- (2004) The Evolution of Institutional Economics: Agency, 
Structure and Darwinism in American Institutionalism, London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Huxley, Thomas Henry (1894) Collected Essays, London: Macmillan. 
.Khan, H. A. (2006). "Poverty Analysis in a Dual-Dual Model" in J. Weiss and H.A. 
Khan (eds.) Poverty Strategies in Asia, Edward Elgar. 
_____ (2004a). “Using Macroeconomic CGE Models for Analyzing the Poverty 
Reduction Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies”, Asian Development 
Bank Institute Discussion Paper No. 12, Tokyo. 
-------- (2004b). “Globalization: Challenges and Opportunities”, Review of 
International Business Research, Vol. 15: 276-91. 
-------- (1999). “Sectoral Growth and Poverty: a multiplier decomposition analysis for 
South Africa, World Development, March. 
 18 
-------- (1997). Technology, Energy and Development: The South Korean Transition, 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
-------- (1994). "Poverty in Bangladesh: What Have We Learned?" in Bangladesh 
Economy, The University Press, Dhaka 
-------- (1985). "Technology Choice in the Energy and Textile Sectors in the Republic 
of Korea," in A.S. Bhalla (ed.) Technology and Employment in Industry, 3rd 
edition 
----- (1983). “Choice of Technology, Energy and Income Distribution: A 
Macroeconomic Framework”, unpublished dissertation, Cornell University 
------ (1982a). "Energy, Technology and Income Distribution: A Social Accounting 
Matrix for Energy Modelling," Applied Simulation and Modelling, Calgary, 
Canada, ACTA 
------ (1982b). “Choice of Technology in the Energy and Textiles Sectors in Korea”, 
World Employment Programme Working Paper, Geneva: ILO 
----- and E. Thorbecke(1988) Macroeconomic Effects and Diffusion of Alternative 
Technologies within a Social Accounting Matrix Framework: the Case of 
Indonesia, Gower Publication, Co., Aldershot, U.K.  
------ (1989). "Macroeconomic Effects of Technology Choice: Multiplier and Structural 
Path Analysis," Journal of Policy Modelling, Vol. 11, No. 1 
Kingdon, G., J. Sandefur and F. Teal (2005). “Labour market flexibility, wages and 
incomes in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s”, Center for the Study of African 
Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, UK.  
 
Knudsen, Thorbjørn (2004) ‘General selection theory and economic evolution: the 
price equation and the genotype/phenotype distinction’, Journal of Economic 
Methodology 11(2): 147–173. 
 
Lawson, Tony (1997) Economics and Reality, London: Routledge. 
Lewis, W. Arthur (1954). “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of 
Labor”, The Manchester School. 
Mayr, Ernst (1964) ‘Introduction’, in facsimile of the first edition of Darwin, harles R. 
(1859) On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of 
Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, London: Murray, pp. vii–xxvii. 
 
-------------- (1988) Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an 
Evolutionist, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press. 
 
---------------(1992) One Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern 
Evolutionary Thought, London: Allen Lane. 
 
 19 
Miller, R.(1987), Fact and Method, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Pyatt, Graham and E. Thorbecke (1976). Planning Techniques for a Better Future, 
Geneva: ILO 
Ray, Debraj(1997) Development Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Romanes, George John (1883) Mental Evolution in Animals, London: Kegan Paul, 
Trench. 
 
----------------------------(1893) Darwin and After Darwin: An Exposition of the 
Darwinian Theory and a Discussion of Post-Darwinian Questions, vol. 1, 2nd edn, 
London: Longmans, Green. 
  
Salmon, Wesley C. (1998) Causality and Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Sen, Amartya (1999). Development as Freedom, Knopf, N.Y. 
Sosa, Ernest and Tooley, Michael (eds) (1993) Causation, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Stifel, David and E. Thorbecke (2003). "A dual-dual CGE Model for a Stylized 
Archetype African Economy", Journal of Policy Modelling, Vol. 25: 207-235. 
Svejnar J. and E. Thorbecke (1980). Determinants and Effects of Technology Choice. 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, San Francisco. 
--------- (1982). The Determinants and Effects of Technology Choices. In Barbara 
Lucas (ed.) Internal and External Constraints on Technology Choice in 
Developing Countries, London: Tooley-Bowker  
Thorbecke, E. (1992). Adjustment and equity in Indonesia, OECD Development 
Centre, Paris.  
--------- (1994)."Adjustment, Growth and Income Distribution in Indonesia." In: D.B. 
Papadimitriou (ed.) Aspects of Distribution of Wealth and Income, The Jerome 
Levy Economics Institute Series, New York: St. Martin's Press,  
------------ and C. Morrisson (1989). “Institutions, Policies and Agricultural 
Performance.” World Development, September. 
Thorbecke, E. and Carlos E. Santiago (1984). Regional and Technological Dualism: 
A Dual-Dual Development Framework Applied to Puerto Rico, The Journal of 
Development Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4, July  
UNCTAD (2006). The Least Developed Countries Report: Developing Productive 
Capacities, Geneva and New York 
 20 
Wendt, Alexander (1998) “On constitution and causation in international relations,” 
Review of International Studies, 24, special issue, 101-17. 
 
---------------------- (1999) Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
---------------------- (2000) “On the via media: a response to the critics,” Review of 
International Studies, 26, 165-180. 
 
---------------------- (2001) “Driving with the rearview mirror: On the rational science 
of institutional design,” International Organization, 55(4), 1019-1049. 
Wilson, Robert A.( 1994)  Causal Depth, Theoretical Appropriateness, and 
Individualism in Psychology, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 61, No. 1 (March), pp. 55-
75 
